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The Effect of Video Franchising Reform on Net Neutrality:
Does the Beginning of IP Convergence Mean that It Is Time
For Net Neutrality Regulation?*
Dan G. Barryt
Abstract
Recent video franchise legislation in several states allow
telephone companies to begin to compete with cable companies in
offering the triple play service of video, voice, and data over an
Internet protocol. This article examines whether this regulatory trend
provides new arguments for regulating net neutrality on the Internet.
Net neutrality is the principle that Internet providers should not
discriminate against unaffiliated content and applications on their
networks. This article first provides an overview of the net neutrality
debate and discusses the potential threats to net neutrality due to
changes in video franchise legislation. In particular, the article
examines the threats posed by increased competition and increased
user bandwidth demand as a result of providing triple play service.
The article then analyzes the current alternatives to net neutrality
regulation and the costs of regulating net neutrality. This analysis
leads to the conclusion that regulating net neutrality would be
premature even in the face of new threats posed by changes in video
franchise legislation.
* Second Prize, SANTA CLARA COMPUTER AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW Journal 2007
Comments Contest.
t J.D. Candidate (2008), Santa Clara University School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Allen Hammond for his valuable comments in developing the topic of this article.
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I. INTRODUCTION
New laws in ten states open the door to phone companies such as
AT&T and Verizon to enter the television market by allowing
statewide video franchising.' Traditionally, cable television
companies have had to negotiate with individual municipalities to
obtain franchise rights to provide television service.2 New statewide
video franchising laws allow phone companies to bypass the time and
expense of negotiating with individual municipalities and allow the
phone companies to obtain a single statewide video franchise.3 Phone
companies plan to take advantage of their growing fiber-optic
networks to offer the "triple play" service of voice, video and data
services all over Internet protocol (IP) in order to compete with cable
companies.4
This convergence of services into an Internet protocol platform
shifts more attention on the network neutrality ("net neutrality")
debate. Net neutrality is the principle that Internet network providers
may not intentionally discriminate against unaffiliated content and
applications on their network.5 This network discrimination could
I. The ten states as of May 14, 2007 to enact statewide video franchising laws include:
California; Indiana; Kansas; Michigan; Missouri; New Jersey; North Carolina; South Carolina;
Texas; and Virginia. The thirteen states where statewide video franchise legislation is pending
as of May 14, 2007 include: Colorado; Connecticut; Florida; Georgia; Idaho; Iowa; Illinois;
Massachusetts; New York; Ohio; Tennessee; Washington; and Wisconsin. TELECOMM. INDUS.
ASs'N, STATE VIDEO FRANCHISE TRACKER (2007),
http://www.tiaonline.org/policy/publications/documents/StateVFTracker-2007.pdf.
2. See Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Video Games: The Oddly Familiar Terms of Debate
About Telco Entry Into the Video Services Market, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 1, 4
(2006) ("Since the dawn of cable television several decades ago, the states and thousands of
local governments have played a critical role in deciding the terms on which cable companies
can use public rights of way to provide multi-channel video services to end-users."). Cf. 47
U.S.C. § 541 (2000) (describing the authority to award cable franchises and the requirement for
cable operators to obtain a franchise in order to provide video services).
3. E.g., Digital Infrastructure and Video Competition Act of 2006, CAL. PUB. UTIL.
CODE § 5840(a) (Deering 2006) ("Neither the commission nor any local franchising entity or
other local entity of the state may require the holder of a state franchise to obtain a separate
franchise or otherwise impose any requirement on any holder of a state franchise except as
expressly provided in this division.").
4. See, e.g., AT&T U-Verse: Innovative New Entertainment Experience,
http://www.att.com/gen/press-roompid=5838 (last visited Oct. 20, 2007).
5. Throughout this paper, the term network provider will be used to refer exclusively to
"last mile" Internet providers such as AT&T and Comeast who deliver Internet service directly
to the consumer. Although the Internet is actually a series of interconnected networks, this paper
focuses on the possibilities and consequences of regulating last mile network providers where a
natural oligopoly arguably exists due to the enormity of investment required in serving the "last
mile" of the network.
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include overt discrimination such as blocking access to unaffiliated
content, or more discrete practices such as providing slower
transmission rates and charging cost prohibitive prices for unaffiliated
network access.6
This net neutrality debate, which was originally considered an
ancillary issue for video franchise legislation, ultimately lead to the
demise of the Communications Opportunity, Promotion, and
Enhancement (COPE) Act of 2006 in the Senate. Similar to the video
franchising reform taking place at the state level, the COPE Act
allowed for nationalized video franchising in order to encourage
telephone companies to expand their high capacity fiber-optic
networks deeper into residential neighborhoods by allowing them to
quickly bypass many local video franchising obstacles. 8 The COPE
Act, however, did not include any safeguards for net neutrality and
failed to gain the support of prominent Democrats in the Senate, who
wrote in the Senate Committee Report that the bill "fails to include
any provisions to protect rival content and applications providers
from unfair discrimination by network operators." 9
Net neutrality regulation proponents argue that Internet providers
in the new triple play market may be tempted to favor their own
content due to an increase in network traffic as a result of providing
converged voice, video, and data service. 10 However, net neutrality
regulation would involve the difficult task of determining what
constitutes unacceptable network discrimination and also runs the risk
of creating enforcement problems where a regulatory scheme may not
even be needed.1 So far, there have been no serious net neutrality
abuses by network providers, and the few cases of network abuse that
6. See Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2. J. ON TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 141, 143 (2003). See also Nuechterlein, supra note 2, at 11.
7. See Mark Sullivan, La-Kyers: Video Franchise Law Won 't Make It, LIGHT READING,
Sept. 21, 2006, http://www.lightreading.com/document.asp?doc id= 104323&print-true
(quoting Jeff Brueggeman, AT&T VP of Regulatory Planning and Policy, as saying: .'[for
many of us it's just been really frustrating' ..... Brueggeman says he and his colleagues didn't
see the net neutrality log-jam coming."). See also Todd Shields, Franchising Face-Off,
MEDIAWEEK, May 22, 2006,
http://www.brandweek.com/bw/search/article-display.jsp?vnu_content- idsc002539830 (noting
that a vote against national video franchising "will likely be due to what first was treated as a
side issue: Net Neutrality.").
8. See Communications Opportunity, Promotion, and Enhancement Act of 2006, H.R.
5252, 109th Cong. § 630 (2006). See also S. REP. NO. 109-355, at 1-2 (2006).
9. S. REP. No. 109-355, at 78-79 (2006).
10. See Neuchterlein, supra note 2, at 10-11.
11. See Edward W. Felten, Nuts and Bolts of Network Neutrality, at 5-6 (July 6, 2006),
http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/pub/neutrality.pdf.
424 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 24
have occurred have been dealt with without the need for new
regulation. 12 Although the benefits of net neutrality are well noted,
without knowing whether regulation will be necessary, the best
approach is to wait and see. Furthermore, the FCC may already have
the tools for preventing the few instances of net neutrality abuse that
may occur under its ancillary jurisdiction in Title I of the
Communications Act and under conditions the FCC has imposed in
reviewing several recent telecommunications mergers. This paper
notes the value of net neutrality, but demonstrates how unnecessary
regulation would be premature and may even cause more harm.
Part II of this paper provides a background on net neutrality
principles and gives an overview of the net neutrality debate. Part III
of this paper examines the potential threats that video franchising
reform might pose to net neutrality by increasing the strain on
network capacity and by encouraging product differentiation among
network providers. Part IV discusses the current alternatives to net
neutrality regulation. Part V of this paper examines the costs of
prematurely imposing net neutrality regulation.
II. NET NEUTRALITY PRINCIPLES AND AN OVERVIEW OF THE
DEBATE
In its most simplified form, the Internet consists of many end
user computers connected to each other by a network that carries data
packets from one end user computer to another end user computer.'
3
This network between end user computers is essentially a set of
routers wired together that pass the end users' data packets from
router to router until they end up at the right end user computer. 14
The Internet is a unique type of network when compared to other
networks such as telephone networks, because the bulk of its
processing power is concentrated at the numerous end user computers
rather than at the routers in the middle of the network.15 A telephone
network, for example, has the bulk of its intelligence concentrated in
the switching computers in the middle of the network while end user
telephones have minimal intelligence.' 6 Unlike a telephone network,
the Internet's "dumb" routers in the middle of the network receive
12. See infra Part III(D) for a discussion of these incidents.
13. Felten, supra note 11, at 1.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 2.
16. JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS:
AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 170 (2005).
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and send packets with minimal processing while most of the
important computing takes place at the sending and receiving
computers, at the ends of the network. 17 By minimizing the
intelligence in the middle of the network, there is arguably less
capability to discriminate among the data packets passed by the
Internet's "dumb" routers. 18 This decentralized network architecture
featuring nondiscriminatory routers is referred to as the end-to-end
principle and is attributed as one of the main reasons for the Internet's
rapid growth and evolution. 19 Net neutrality proponents generally note
four main advantages to having the bulk of the network's intelligence
concentrated at the ends. The first of these advantages is that end user
computers collectively have more memory and processing power. The
end user computers are more numerous than the routers comprising
the network's infrastructure, and therefore it is a more efficient use of
resources to concentrate the network's intelligence where the most
computing resources are available.2 ° Second, the end user computers
better reflect what most users want, as these computers are directly
controlled by the network's end users.2 ' The third advantage of
keeping intelligence out of the middle is that it promotes
interoperability among applications by standardizing the middle of the
network.22 Lastly, net neutrality proponents insist that innovation
develops faster and fuller at the ends of the network because the end
users are more diverse and numerous than the network providers in
the middle.
17. See Felten, supra note 11, at 2; see also NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 16, at
170.
18. See Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Innovation, 51 DUKE L.J. 1783, 1789
(2002) ("The fundamental feature of this network design was neutrality among packets. The
network was simple or "stupid,"... and the consequence of stupidity, at least among computers,
is the inability to discriminate.").
19. See Felten, supra note 11, at 2; see also Lawrence Lessig, Architecting Innovation, 49
DRAKE L. REV. 397,403 (2001).
20. See Felten, supra note 11, at 2.
21. Id.
22. See Joseph Farrell & Phillip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open
Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 90 (2003), (noting that the Internet's end to end architecture "reflects
the Internet Pioneer's conscious strategy that the platform should not anticipate what
applications would rely on it, and that no central gatekeeper should decide which applications
could be provided."). See also LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE
COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 36-37 (2001) (noting that by following the end to end
principle, "innovators with new applications need only connect their computers to the network
to let their applications run.").
23. See Felten, supra note 11, at 2.
426 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. l.J. [Vol. 24
Generally, the net neutrality debate can be characterized as "a
fight between the edges and the middle over control of the
network., 24 Net neutrality regulation is supported by companies such
as Google, Yahoo!, Amazon and Vonage who are at the edges of the
network and provide content and applications to Internet users.
25
Network providers in the middle of the network, such as AT&T and
Comcast, generally oppose net neutrality rules and view the network
as an investment that they should be able to use as they see fit to reap
the greatest return on their investment. 26 "Each group wants the part
of the network that it controls to have most of the intelligence,
because more opportunities to innovate-and profit from
innovation-are available to those who control the intelligent parts of
the network.,
27
Net neutrality proponents believe that control over how the
Internet is used should remain in the hands of the ends of the network
and out of the hands of the network providers in the middle. Net
neutrality proposals, therefore, focus on protecting companies in the
application and content markets from discrimination by network
providers. Advocates of net neutrality regulation argue that
government action is necessary to maintain the free and innovative
Internet that exists today. Opponents, however, argue that net
neutrality regulation is either unnecessary or will be flawed in
practice.
There were several bills proposed in the 109th Session of
Congress that were focused upon regulating net neutrality. These bills
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. This proprietary view of the Internet has been espoused by several network provider
representatives such as AT&T CEO and Chairman Ed Whitacre who told Business Week in an
interview published on November 7, 2005 that Internet upstarts such as Google, MSN, and
Vonage want
to use my pipes for free, but I ain't going to let them do that because we have
spent this capital and we have to have a return on it. So there's going to have to
be some mechanism for these people who use these pipes to pay for the portion
they're using. Why should they be allowed to use my pipes?
Patricia O'Connell, At SBC, It's All About "'Scale and Scope ", Bus. WK. ONLINE, Nov. 7, 2005,
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_45/b3958092.htm. Another example of this
network propriety view was noted in a January 6, 2006 Wall Street Journal article which quoted
Verizon's CEO Ivan Seidenberg as saying "[w]e have to make sure [content and application
providers] don't sit on our network and chew up our capacity." Dionne Searcy & Amy Schatz,
Phone Companies Set Off a Battle Over Internet Fees-Content Providers May Face Charges
for Fast Access; Billing the Customer Twice?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2006, at Al.
27. Felten, supra note 11, at 2.
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included: (1) the Internet Non-Discrimination Act of 2006;28 (2) the
Internet Freedom and Nondiscrimination Act of 2006;29 and (3) the
Internet Freedom Preservation Act.30 The common theme of these
proposed bills was to establish a duty for public broadband network
providers to refrain from discriminating against Internet traffic for an
anticompetitive purpose. Although there is little current need for net
neutrality regulation, proposed legislation may serve as an ever-ready
threat to network providers who generally seek to be free from any
form of regulation. However, video franchising reform may provide
legislators with new reasons to regulate net neutrality in the 1 10th
Session of Congress.
Il1. THE POTENTIAL THREATS TO NET NEUTRALITY FROM VIDEO
FRANCHISING REFORM AND IP CONVERGENCE
A. The Current State of Video Franchising Reform
Title VI of the Communications Act establishes the current
regulatory framework for video franchising and recognizes a
multijurisdictional approach between federal, state, and local
governments. 3' As part of the video franchising negotiations under
Title VI, state and local governments can require cable providers to
pay franchise fees, serve all areas within the community, 32 provide
free service to government buildings, and designate channel capacity
for governmental use. 33 In exchange, cable providers are allowed to
28. Internet Non-Discrimination Act of 2006, S. 2360, 109th Cong. (2006).
29. Internet Freedom and Nondiscrimination Act of 2006, H.R. 5417, 109th Cong.
(2006).
30. Internet Freedom Preservation Act, S. 2917, 109th Cong. (2006).
31. This multijurisdictional approach is provided for in 47 U.S.C. § 521 which states that
the purpose of Title VI is to "establish guidelines for the exercise of Federal, State, and local
authority with respect to the regulation of cable systems." 47 U.S.C. § 521(3) (2000). In
addition, 47 U.S.C. § 556 provides that "[n]othing in this subchapter shall be construed to
restrict a State from exercising jurisdiction with regard to cable services consistent with this
subchapter." 47 U.S.C. § 556(a) (2000).
32. "In awarding a franchise or franchises, a franchising authority shall assure that access
to cable service is not denied to any group of potential residential cable subscribers because of
the income of the residents of the local area in which such group resides." 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(3)
(2000).
33. 47 U.S.C.§ 541 states that "a franchising authority may not require a cable operator to
provide any telecommunications service or facilities, other than institutional networks, as a
condition of the initial grant of a franchise, a franchise renewal, or a transfer of a franchise." 47
U.S.C. § 541(b)(3)(D) (2000). Additionally, 47 U.S.C. § 531 permits a local franchising
authority to require "that channel capacity be designated for public, educational, or
governmental use, and channel capacity on institutional networks be designated for educational
or governmental use." 47 U.S.C. § 53 1(b) (2000).
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sell video service in the community and to receive the public rights of
way necessary to build its network.34
Several states, however, have recently enacted video franchise
laws that allow for a single franchise agreement for the entire state in
order to entice telephone companies to compete with the incumbent
cable companies. 35 Telephone companies never seriously attempted to
enter the television market until their expansion of DSL Internet
service prompted them to extend their fiber-optic networks further
into residential areas. 36 These fiber-optic networks can support both
broadband Internet service and high quality video and voice
services. 37 Although this "fiber build-out" is still under construction,
telephone companies such as AT&T and Verizon claim that they will
commit to finishing the "fiber build-out" and begin competing in the
television market as soon as they are relieved of the burdens of local
video franchising.3 8 These new state video franchising laws are not
only intended to promote competition in the cable market, but more
importantly, are intended to encourage telephone companies to
expand their high speed fiber-optic networks deeper into residential
areas. 39 Many states have recognized the importance of deploying
high capacity fiber-optic networks and are now enacting new video
franchising laws to achieve this goal.4 °
This video franchising reform is also beginning at the national
level as evidenced in the last session of Congress with two proposed
34. See 47 U.S.C. § 541(b)(1) (2000) ("[A] cable operator may not provide cable service
without a franchise."). See also 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2) (2000) ("Any franchise shall be construed
to authorize the construction of a cable system over public rights-of-way, and through easements
35. See TELECOMM. INDUS. ASS'N, supra note 1.
36. Nuechterlein, supra note 2, at 4-5.
37. Id. at 5.
38. See id.
39. California's Digital Infrastructure and Video Competition Act of 2006 states that
"[i]ncreased competition in the cable and video service sector provides consumers with more
choice, lowers prices, speeds the deployment of new communication and broadband
technologies, creates jobs, and benefits the California economy." The Digital Infrastructure and
Video Competition Act of 2006, CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 5810(a)(l)(B) (West Supp. 2007).
The Act also provides that "[l]egislation to develop this new process should ... [c]omplement
efforts to increase investment in broadband infrastructure and close the digital divide." Id. §
5810(a)(2).
40. The importance of extending fiber networks is evidenced in a California study that
found that providing each home in California with a I GBps connection by 2010 would generate
2 million additional jobs and add $376 billion to the incremental gross state product.
CORPORATION FOR EDUCATION NETWORK INITIATIVES IN CALIFORNIA, ONE GIGABYTE OR
BUST INITIATIVE: A BROADBAND VISION FOR CALIFORNIA 1 (2003),
http://www.cenic.org/publications/archives/glossies/Gartner-Full.pdf.
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bills allowing for nationwide video franchising. The COPE Act which
originated in the House and the Advanced Telecommunications and
Opportunities Reform Act, which originated in the Senate, both
proposed nationwide video franchising and both had the same
legislative intent to promote competition in the cable market and to
encourage telephone companies to extend their high speed fiber-optic
networks a.4 However, the benefits of increased broadband access and
video competition result in two new threats to net neutrality in the
form of product differentiation and strains on network capacity.
B. Increased Competition and Product Differentiation via
Media Alliances
There are two main theoretical threats that video franchising
reform poses to net neutrality. First, increased competition between
the incumbent cable companies and the burgeoning telephone
companies will provide an incentive for network providers to
differentiate their products. By differentiating their products,
providers can claim that their network offers the consumer something
that no other network can offer. Proponents of net neutrality
regulation fear that this tendency toward product differentiation will
spur exclusive media alliances between network providers and
content providers. For example, a network provider offering a Yahoo!
application that is only available to its customers may have an
incentive to provide faster service to its exclusive Yahoo! application
than to a competing Google application in order to maximize the
value of the Yahoo! application to its network.42 These exclusive
deals therefore act as a type of vertical integration between content
41. Senator Ted Stevens, who proposed the Advanced Telecommunications and
Opportunities Reform Act, has been quoted as saying that "[o]ne of the most important
questions" in telecommunications legislation is whether "cable and the Bells can generate the
revenue needed to deploy fiber." Drew Clark, Cable Firms Push for Flexibility in "Net
Neutrality" Model, NAT'L J.'s TECH. DAILY, Feb. 6, 2006,
http://nationaljoumal.com/about/technologydaily/. (The purpose of the COPE Act in
encouraging the deployment of high speed broadband networks was evidenced by the bill's full
title as introduced: "To promote the deployment of broadband networks and services."
Communications, Opportunity, Promotion and Enhancement Act of 2006, H.R. 5252, 109th
Cong. (2006).
42. Often the value of networked products is increased by the number of people using the
product on the network. This increase in value is referred to as network effects and would apply
to an application such as instant messaging where users can only connect with other users of the
particular instant messenger application. There is then a network effect or an increase in the
value of the service as more people subscribe because current users have more networked
subscribers to instant message.
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providers and network providers feared by most net neutrality
proponents.
Some who argue against net neutrality regulation contend that
this product differentiation is necessary to encourage broadband
network providers to build out their networks.43 The argument is that
network providers will be unwilling to invest in expanding their fiber-
optic networks without identifying a niche where they could recoup
their investments. 4 Therefore, net neutrality regulation opponents
argue that proposals preventing this type of vertical integration or
product differentiation would only inhibit broadband deployment.45
C. The Race to Keep Up With User Bandwidth Demands in the
"Ultimate Net Neutrality Battleground ,
46
The other potential threat that video franchising reform poses to
net neutrality is that the convergence of voice, video and data into an
Internet protocol platform could strain the capacity of the network as
it is being upgraded.47 By providing triple play service, the bandwidth
demands on the network will be greater and network providers will
need to resort to more prioritization of IP traffic.48 The threat is that
network providers, when given a choice between prioritizing
affiliated content or unaffiliated content, will intentionally choose to
downgrade the priority of unaffiliated traffic.49
43. See Christopher Yoo, Would Mandating Broadband Network Neutrality Help or Hurt
Competition? A Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 23,
29 (2004).
44. See Wu, supra note 6, at 170 (discussing network owners' return on investment in
infrastructure).
45. Cf id. (noting the objection that net neutrality regulation "overly interferes with
broadband carriers' ability to earn a return on their infrastructure investment," although not
specifically discussing the inhibition of network expansion).
46. Nuechterlein, supra note 2, at 10 (referring to close to real-time "[v]ideo-over-IP,
with its prodigious quality-of-service demands" as the "ultimate net neutrality battleground").
47. Both Verizon and AT&T already offer IP based video and data service and plan on
competing with cable providers such as Comcast who have also begun offering voice, video and
data over an IP network. See Sullivan, supra note 7.
48. See Nuechterlein, supra note 2, at 10. Nuechterlein notes that the net neutrality
issue will come to a head when telcos and the cable companies begin running all
of the services they provide consumers, including both voice and video, as
applications over a unified IP platform. As that process unfolds, it will become
increasingly necessary for these physical-layer transmission providers to
distinguish among the packets passing through their pipes and give preferential
treatment to some packets over others to ensure quality of service for time-
sensitive applications.
49. See id
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An example of this incentive to downgrade the priority of
unaffiliated applications would be if Comcast forced its VoIP traffic
ahead of traffic from VolP services provided by Vonage or Skype.
50
This same prioritization fear could be applied to video service as well
because there may be an inherent conflict of interest between a
network provider's video service and the video service of another
application or content provider on the Internet.51 Many net neutrality
advocates fear that as strains on network capacity increase due to
more bandwidth intensive applications and increasing triple play
subscribership, network providers will have more incentives to
discriminate in favor of their own applications.
D. Why Net Neutrality Regulation Is Still Premature
Despite these potential threats from video franchise reform, net
neutrality regulation has not yet proven itself to be necessary for
innovation to continue to thrive on the Internet. Perhaps the strongest
argument against imposing net neutrality regulation is the fact that
there have been relatively few examples of network providers overtly
discriminating against network traffic.52 So far, the few cases of
network providers abusing their control of the network have been
quickly remedied by complaints from consumers and application
providers. 53
50. The Comcast-BitTorrent debacle discussed in footnote 53 illustrates a real-world
example of a network provider's incentive to discriminate against unaffiliated applications that
require large amounts of bandwidth.
51. See Jerome H. Saltzer, "Open Access" Is Just the Tip of the Iceburg, Oct. 22, 1999,
http://web.mit.edu/Saltzer/www/publications/openaccess.html.
52. See Wu, supra note 6, at 164 (surveying broadband usage restrictions and concluding
that "there is no broad effort to ban everything that might be said to threaten the interests of
cable and DSL operators"). Although cable and DSL operators may refrain in banning
competing applications, there may be more subtle forms of network discrimination that have
gone undetected.
53. In what has been described as "a major public relations problem," Comeast has
gained recent attention for allegedly interrupting peer-to-peer file transfers. See Brad Stone,
Comcast: We're Delaying. Not Blocking BitTorrent Traffic , N.Y.TIMES, Oct. 22, 2007,
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/10/22/comcast-were-delaying-not-blocking-bittorrent-
traffic/#more-564. Comcast denies blocking access to any web sites or online applications, such
as BitTorrent's peer-to-peer file transfer program. Id. However, a Comcast executive has
explained that Comcast uses "data management technologies to conserve bandwidth and allow
customers to experience the Interet without delays. As part of that management process, he
said, the company occasionally -- but not always -- delays some peer-to-peer file transfers that
eat into Internet speeds for other users on the network." Id. At press, it is unknown whether
Comcast's data management practices will create enough bad press and consumer complaints to
force Comcast to stop delaying file transfers as competition intensifies with other broadband
providers. This example also illustrates the difficulties that net neutrality regulation would face
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The most notorious case of net neutrality abuse occurred in
February of 2005 when a telephone company called Madison River
Communications blocked its customers' VolP traffic on its DSL
network.54 Vonage, a VoIP application provider, complained to the
FCC and within a month, Madison River agreed to stop blocking
VoIP traffic and to pay a $15,000 fine to the Government in response
to an investigation.5 5 The FCC was able to investigate the complaint
about VoIP blocking using existing regulations under Title I and Title
II of the Communications Act, without the need for additional net
neutrality regulations.56 There has yet to be any other significant
problems of network abuse and the limited examples of
anticompetitive discrimination have all been efficiently resolved
without net neutrality regulation.
Furthermore, imposing net neutrality regulation assumes that
consumers will not be able to choose a network that does not
discriminate against unaffiliated content. 57 In the case of broadband
service platforms, it is still too early to decide whether there will
indeed be a physical network monopoly that might someday prevent
consumers from choosing a network that does not restrict content or
applications. This fear is especially speculative when considering that
most markets tend to be heading towards at least a duopoly between
an incumbent cable company and an incumbent telephone company.
8
in distinguishing between data management practices and intentional network abuse as
discussed in Part V(A) infra.
54. In re Madison River Commc'ns LLC & Affiliated Co., 20 F.C.C.R. 4295, 4297
(2005) [hereinafter Madison River Order].
55. Declan McCullagh, Telco Agrees to Stop Blocking VolP Calls, CNET NEWS.COM,
Mar. 3, 2005, http://news.com.com/Telco+agrees+to+stop+blocking+VoIP+calls/2100-7352_3-
5598633.html.
56. See Madison River Order, supra note 54, at 4297. The investigation was to determine
whether Madison River violated 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) which only applies to common carriers
providing a telecommunications service. Since the Madison River Order, DSL and cable
broadband services have been classified as an information service rather than a
telecommunications service. See Nat'l Cable and Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs.,
545 U.S. 967, 986-1000 (2005) (confirming Cable internet as an information service); In re
Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20
F.C.C.R. 14853 (2005) [hereinafter Wireline Broadband Order] (classifying DSL as an
information service). This leaves open the question of how the FCC would currently investigate
a complaint of net neutrality abuse. The FCC, however, has ancillary jurisdiction over
information service providers under Title I and could theoretically still impose net neutrality
regulations upon information service providers if needed. See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 976. This
concept is explored further in Part IV(C) below.
57. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 16, at 156.
58. See CHARLES B. GOLDFARB, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ACCESS TO BROADBAND
NETWORKS 20 ( 2006), http://www.ipmall.info/hostedresources/crs/RL33496_060629.pdf.
2008] THE EFFECT OF VIDEO FRANCHISING REFORM 433
Regulation proponents contend that this duopoly is not a
sufficient safeguard for net neutrality, 59 however, it is still too soon to
say what effect new technologies such as WiMax or Broadband-over-
Powerline will have in promoting consumer choice. In fact, recent
research tends to suggest that wireless broadband platforms may
induce a third dominant broadband network platform.6° With multiple
networks for consumers to choose from on the horizon, it is unlikely
that network providers will want to violate net neutrality because
consumers could just pick a network that does not restrict their access
61to content or applications.
IV. CURRENT ALTERNATIVES TO NET NEUTRALITY REGULATION
A. Market Demand and Why Network Providers May Not Even
Want to Discriminate
Another reason net neutrality regulation may not be needed
relates to an economic theory called the "internalization of
complementary externalities" (ICE).62 The core of the ICE theory is
that even if a network monopoly were to occur, a network provider
would still have strong incentives to promote competition among
content and application providers on its network because encouraging
new complementary products increases the value of its network by
increasing consumer demand for the network.63 This theory is based
upon the economic principle that:
[T]he total profits a monopolist can earn if it seeks to leverage its
monopoly in one market (here, the market for physical-layer
broadband access) by dominating a complementary market (here,
the applications and content markets) are theoretically no greater
than the extra profits it could earn in an unregulated environment
simply by charging more for the monopoly product itself. This fact
gives the monopoly platform provider a powerful incentive to
59. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 16, at 156. But see Yoo, supra note 43, at
64 (noting that "the presence of a single competitor of roughly the same size as [a] network
owner is likely sufficient to eliminate any such [interconnection] problems").
60. See Justin P. Hedge, The Decline of Title IH Common-Carrier Regulations in the
Wake of Brand X. Long-Run Success for Consumers, Competition, and the Broadband Internet,
14 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 427,448 (2006).
61. See GOLDFARB, supra note 58, at 17 (noting that "restrictive behavior would reduce
overall demand for the broadband network and also increase incentives for competitive entry").
62. Neuchterlein, supra note 2, at 11. See also Farrell & Weiser, supra note 22, at 100-
01.
63. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 16, at 157; see also Farrell & Weiser,
supra note 22, at 100-04.
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enhance its platform's attractiveness to consumers so that more of
them will pay a higher price for it.
64
The main conclusion drawn by applying ICE theory to the
broadband market is that even in a monopoly, a network provider still
has profit incentives to encourage diverse content and applications on
their network to maximize demand for their network.
One potential weakness of ICE theory is that it does not take into
account the ease with which (or difficulty with which) consumers can
switch network providers.65 Arguably, there is a cost associated with
switching to a new network provider-consumers may temporarily be
without service or may have to switch to a new email account. 66 The
cost of switching may even be compounded by triple play service,
where switching network providers would mean simultaneously being
without voice, video and data service. Furthermore, the ease with
which consumers will be able to switch network providers is still
unknown, especially in light of emerging wireless platforms where
switching service could theoretically be a matter of typing in an
authorization code.
Despite this possible flaw, market demand has already had a
considerable impact in safeguarding net neutrality in numerous
instances. For example, in the late eighties and early nineties, AOL
initially sought to offer its subscribers a "fenced-in" Internet of
affiliated sites.6 7 This plan was quickly dropped, however, as the
Internet grew and consumers demanded access to the whole Internet.
68
A similar example of market demand safeguarding net neutrality
involved network providers' early attempts at blocking or limiting
streaming video applications. 69 Eventually, network providers gave in
to consumer demands for unrestricted use of streaming video
applications.7 ° In addition, some cable network providers blocked the
use of virtual private network (VPN) applications that provide
64. NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 16, at 157.
65. See id. at 156 (discussing the possible difficulties in changing networks in the context
of market demand limiting network discrimination).
66. See id. (noting the disincentive for consumers to switch networks given a heavily-
used email account).
67. Id. at 155.
68. See Wikipedia, Walled Garden (Media),
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walledgarden_(media) (last visited Oct. 21, 2007) ("AOL started
its business with revenue-sharing agreements with certain information providers in their
subscriber-only space, but later offered general Internet access.").
69. See Saltzer, supra note 51 (commenting on streaming video application limits set by
network providers in the late 1990's).
70. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 16, at 173.
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encryption for Internet users due to the high bandwidth requirements
of VPN applications. 71 However, as more consumers began working
from home via the Internet, the demand to be able to use VPN
applications grew and cable companies eventually yielded in order to
retain their customers.7 2
In both of the examples of streaming video and VPN, network
providers cited the high bandwidth requirements of these applications
as reasons for not allowing the applications on their networks. As
technology increased the bandwidth capacity of their networks, these
arguments carried less weight. The same will be especially true in the
case of fiber-optic networks.73 The fear of triple play service straining
network capacity, as discussed in Part III (C), will carry less weight as
high capacity fiber-optic networks get closer and closer to consumers'
homes. The high capacity of fiber networks may eventually eradicate
the need for mandating net neutrality regulation due to increased user
bandwidth requirements.
B. Antitrust
One reason there may not be many examples of anticompetitive
discrimination is because such a restraint on trade would be subject to
antitrust action under the Sherman and Clayton Acts, which carry
treble damages for plaintiffs in addition to serious criminal
penalties.74
The most likely means of enforcing net neutrality with antitrust
would involve a claim of monopolization violating section 2 of the
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Downstream fiber-optic speeds range from 622 Mbps to 2.5 Gbps depending upon the
network standards used. PMC-Sierra.com, FTTH Fiber to Home Overview, http://www.pmc-
sierra.com/ftth-pon/ftth overview.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2007). AT&T and Comcast
currently advertise downstream speeds of up to 6 and 12 Mbps, respectively. See Press Release,
AT&T, AT&T Gives Higher Speed Broadband Customers Free Access to Nation's Largest Wi-
Fi Network (July 2, 2007), http://www.att.com/gen/press-
room?pid=4800&cdvn=news&newsarticleid=2403 1. See also Comcast, Shop for Comcast
Products, http://www.comcast.com/Corporate/Shop/ProductOverview.html (last visited Oct. 23,
2007).
74. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that "[a]ny person who shall be injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore ...
without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him
sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000).
The criminal penalties under section 2 of the Sherman Act include a "fine not exceeding
$100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not
exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments." 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000 & Supp. IV 2005).
These hefty damages pose a strong incentive to keep network providers from violating antitrust
laws.
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Sherman Act.75 A monopolization violation under section 2 requires
the plaintiff to prove that the defendant possesses monopoly power in
the relevant market.76 The plaintiff must also prove the monopoly is
the result of "the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident., 77 A plaintiff
must therefore prove that the defendant's acquisition of monopoly
power was in some way due to a predatory or anticompetitive
activity.78 A network provider achieving or maintaining monopoly
power by intentionally blocking or degrading the quality of
competing content or applications would seem to satisfy this
requirement.
However, antitrust under section 2 of the Sherman Act is not a
perfect solution to preventing net neutrality abuse because it leaves
out network providers who do not possess monopoly power.
Additionally, it may be difficult to prove that the network provider
has monopoly power, or even more difficult, that the network
provider's traffic blocking or discrimination was an anticompetitive
activity. These difficulties are evidenced by the antitrust actions
against AT&T by both MCI and the Government, which took many
years to resolve despite numerous acts of anticompetitive behavior
and strong evidence establishing AT&T's monopoly power.79
Furthermore, the result of protracted antitrust litigation may not have
much of a practical effect, given that the technological landscape may
have completely changed during the litigation.
In the meantime, network providers will not know how to act
during pending antitrust litigation. The telecommunications industry
is often dependent upon significant investments in technology and
any pending antitrust action may inhibit investment in technologies
75. Although applicable in many computer antitrust cases, tying arrangements as detailed
under section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 2 of the Clayton Act, would likely not succeed
in a net neutrality abuse case because the blocking or degrading of unaffiliated content or
applications would not fit under the tying definition of "the sale of one separate and distinct
product (the 'tying product') on the condition that the buyer also purchase from the seller a
second product (the 'tied product')." Kelly A. O'Connor, Emerging Antitrust Issues Affecting the
Computer Industry, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 819, 821 (1995).
76. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
77. Id.
78. See O'Connor, supra note 75, at 825.
79. See James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection, 54
FED. COMM. L.J. 225, 277 (2002) ("MCI's litigation against AT&T, which was based upon
serious and repetitive anticompetitive activities by AT&T, did not by itself result in any
substantial change in AT&T's behavior. The Internet market likely cannot tolerate such
delays.").
2008] THE -FFECT OF VIDEO FRANCHISING REFORM 437
related to the antitrust litigation.80 Rule making by the FCC, in
contrast, can provide quicker guidance as to the legality of new
technologies and practices so as not to stifle investment.
Another problem with antitrust litigation is that the judges
deciding net neutrality cases may lack the industry expertise to
structure a remedy that takes into account the direction of the Internet
industry. Antitrust critics often cite to the AT&T antitrust cases to
support this point.8' During the AT&T antitrust case, Judge Harold
Greene made a number of prospective decisions on the direction of
the telecommunications industry that have since been criticized.82 The
FCC with its expertise in regulating the telecommunications industry
would arguably be better poised to predict the direction of the Internet
industry than the generalist judiciary. 83
In Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko, the Supreme Court made a more narrow finding that antitrust
litigation is not an appropriate method of fixing competition problems
in the telecommunications industry given that the industry is heavily
regulated.84 However, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 includes
an "antitrust savings clause," which provides that "nothing in the Act
80. Cf. NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 16, at 416 (discussing the benefits of
regulatory certainty for both telecommunications giants and pioneers).
81. See id. at415.
82. See Joseph D. Kearney, From the Fall of the Bell System to the Telecommunications
Act. Regulation of Telecommunications Under Judge Greene, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1395, 1397-98
(1999).
83. Although FCC commissioners may have more industry expertise than the generalist
judiciary, judges are arguably more neutral than FCC commissioners who are usually from the
telecommunications industry and may be predisposed towards deciding in favor of former
employers or industry allies. This concept is often referred to as agency capture. However, the
same issues of impartiality can also be raised in considering the individual preferences of district
judges in pursuing antitrust claims, or even a judge's favoritism for a local corporation. One
such case often cited by telecommunications industry commentators as an example of judge
shopping is SBC Commcunications, Inc. v. FCC, 981 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Tex. 1997), rev'd 154
F.3d 226 (5th Cir. 1998), where a specific district court judge was targeted by two telephone
company plaintiffs in order to invalidate provisions of section 271 of the Communications Act
as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note
16, at 415.
84. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 16. at 417 (citing Verizon Commc'ns, Inc.
v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004)). Although Trinko involved an antitrust
challenge involving forced facilities access of telephone companies categorized as incumbent
local exchange carriers (ILECs), its use for net neutrality purposes is analogous in that
mandating net neutrality under antitrust can be viewed as a type of forced access (as the term
relates to antitrust principles rather than under the Telecommunications Act of 1996) placed
upon network providers. In addition, the Court's analysis on the role between the courts and the
FCC in preventing anticompetitive behavior by network providers is illustrative of the deference
given to the FCC in shaping anticompetitive policies in the telecommunications industry.
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or in the amendments made by this Act shall be construed to modify,
impair, or supersede the applicability of any antitrust laws." 85 In
Trinko, the Supreme Court interpreted this antitrust savings clause as
preserving "claims that satisfy existing antitrust standards" and did
not interpret the clause as creating any new antitrust claims that did
not already exist.
86
The Trinko Court then limited the cases where a monopolization
antitrust claim could force a network provider to help its rivals
compete-otherwise known as a refusal-to-deal claim under section 2
of the Sherman Act.87 The Court noted that refusal-to-deal cases were
limited to situations where the anticompetitive motive of the
defendant was clearly shown due to a preexisting relationship with its
rival followed by the refusal to deal with the rival under otherwise
advantageous circumstances.88 This means that to fit into an existing
antitrust refusal-to-deal claim, a network provider would have to
initially allow the competing content or application on its network.
Moreover, the subsequent blocking or degrading of the competing
content or application could not be rationalized by a technological
advantage to the network provider in order to demonstrate a clear
anticompetitive motive. The difficulty in arguing a refusal-to-deal
claim in the net neutrality context would be demonstrating that the
network provider did not have some other reason for degrading the
competing traffic in light of the network provider's network
management needs.
The Trinko Court did not hold that new exceptions to the general
rule that businesses can choose with whom they deal could never be
made, but rather, only found that the dangers of imposing a judicial
solution to just one firm in the heavily regulated field of
telecommunications could cause more harm than good.89 The Court
explained that a judicial solution forcing a network provider to help
its rivals may be harmful "because of the uncertain virtue of forced
sharing and the difficulty of identifying and remedying
anticompetitive conduct by a single firm."
90
Ultimately, the Trinko Court found that "[e]nforced sharing also
requires antitrust courts to act as central planners, identifying the
85. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 601(b)(1), 110 Stat. 56,
143 (1996).
86. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407.
87. See id. at 408-11.
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. Id. at 408.
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proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing-a role for which
they are ill suited." 9' The Court's preference for regulation over
litigation, therefore, provides the FCC a more central role in shaping
the policies regarding anticompetitive conduct involving net
neutrality.
C. The FCC's Ancillary Jurisdiction under Title I
The FCC can no longer regulate net neutrality under Title II as in
the Madison River Order discussed in Part Ill(D). After the Supreme
Court's decision in Brand X upheld the FCC's classification of cable
modem Internet access as an information service, the FCC adopted an
order classifying wire-line broadband access and wireless broadband
access as information services. 92 Broadband service as an information
service, as opposed to a telecommunications service, cannot be
regulated under Title II of the Communications Act.93 This is a
critical point in the net neutrality regulation debate because Title II
would arguably allow for the enforcement of net neutrality. Section
201(a) in Title It requires the interconnection of telecommunications
carriers and section 201(b) prohibits anticompetitive discrimination in
providing this interconnection. 94 Section 201(b) allowed the FCC to
investigate Madison River Communications, because at the time, DSL
service was still considered a telecommunications service regulated
under Title II. As an information service, any regulation of DSL, or
any other form of broadband service, would need to be grounded by
default in the FCC's ancillary authority described under Title I.
91. Id.
92. See Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 56, at 14862; See also Appropriate
Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireless Networks, 22
F.C.C.R. 5901 (2007) (declaratory ruling).
93. See Nat'l Cable and Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 973-
74 (2005).
94. 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000) states:
It shall be the duty of every common carrier engaged in interstate or foreign
communication by wire or radio to furnish such communication service upon
reasonable request therefore; and, in accordance with the orders of the
Commission, in cases where the Commission, after opportunity for hearing, finds
such action necessary or desirable in the public interest, to establish physical
connections with other carriers, to establish through routes and charges
applicable thereto and the divisions of such charges, and to establish and provide
facilities and regulations for operating such through routes.
Net neutrality could then be regulated under 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) which provides that "[a]ll
charges, practices, classifications, and regulations for and in connection with such
communication service, shall be just and reasonable, and any such charge, practice,
classification, or regulation that is unjust or unreasonable is declared to be unlawful." 47 U.S.C.
§ 201(b) (2000)
440 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 24
Title I establishes the FCC "[f]or the purpose of regulating
interstate foreign commerce in communications by wire and radio"
95
and section 2 provides that "[t]he provisions of [the Communications
Act] shall apply to all interstate and foreign communications by wire
or radio."96 The main part of Title I's ancillary authority is provided
by section 154(i) granting the FCC rulemaking and enforcement
authority by stating that "[t]he Commission may perform any and all
acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders not
inconsistent with [the Communications Act], as may be necessary in
the execution of its functions." 97 The limits of this potentially broad
authority are dependent upon the characterizations of "not
inconsistent with [the Communications Act]," and "as may be
necessary in the execution of its functions."
In United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., the Supreme Court
shed some light on these limitations and held that entities not covered
under the other titles of the Communications Act can be regulated
under its ancillary jurisdiction.98 The Southwestern Cable Court
upheld the FCC's authority under ancillary jurisdiction to limit the
ability of cable companies to retransmit signals from distant television
stations, even though at the time of the case, the Communications Act
did not cover the relatively new cable industry as either a common
carrier under Title II or as a broadcaster under Title 1ll.99 The Court
supported the broad application of ancillary jurisdiction to cable
companies not covered under the Communications Act because
"[n]othing in the language of § 152(a), in the surrounding language,
or in the Act's history or purposes limits the Commission's authority
to those activities and forms of communication that are specifically
described by the Act's other provisions."'
00
The rationale the Court used in upholding the FCC's exercise of
ancillary jurisdiction was that the FCC's order limiting the areas of
service of cable companies was reasonably required to promote the
development of local UHF broadcasters, which is an FCC
responsibility under Title II.10 Therefore, the FCC can regulate
95. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
96. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (2000).
97. 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (2000).
98. See United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 172.
101. See id. at 173-74 (finding the objectives outlined in 47 U.S.C. § 303 and § 307 grant
the FCC "authority to allocate broadcasting zones or areas, and to provide regulations as [the
FCC] may deem necessary to prevent interference among the various stations"); see also id. at
2008] THE EFF:ECT OF VIDEO FRANCHISING REFORM 441
entities such as information service providers that are not covered
under other titles if they could reasonably interfere with the FCC's
responsibilities under other titles of the Communications Act.
Three years after upholding the FCC's ancillary jurisdiction over
the cable industry in Southwestern Cable, the Court again upheld the
FCC's use of ancillary jurisdiction in United States v. Midwest Video
Corp. 102 This time, the Court upheld an FCC order that required cable
companies to provide their own programming in addition to the
broadcasting that cable television had traditionally only received from
broadcast stations and redistributed to its customers. 1
03
It was not until 1979 in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest
Video 11) that the Court defined the extent of the FCC's ancillary
jurisdiction over the cable industry.' 0 4 In Midwest Video II, the FCC
had imposed an obligation upon cable companies to carry public
access channels. 10 5 This was before the Cable Act of 1984 that added
Title VI to regulate cable services, and therefore, carrying public
access channels was not required of cable companies or their
broadcast counterparts under Title 111.106 The Midwest Video H Court
held that the FCC could not use Title I to impose regulations upon
Title I services that could not be applied to similar services under the
Act's other titles.' 0 7 The Court, therefore, limited the application of
ancillary jurisdiction to promoting the effect of existing regulations
under the other titles.
The key to any FCC regulation of net neutrality under Title I
depends upon protecting the effectiveness of existing regulations
under the Communications Act. The technological convergence of
traditional services covered under the substantive titles of the
Communications Act presents some new sources for the FCC to
regulate the underlying Internet protocol platform with its ancillary
jurisdiction.) 8 For instance, Title VI regulating cable operators states
177 ("The Commission has been charged with broad responsibilities for the orderly
development of an appropriate system of local television broadcasting ... The Commission has
reasonably found that the successful performance of these duties demands prompt and
efficacious regulation of community antenna television systems [cable television].").
102. United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
103. Id. at 659-70
104. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 708-09 (1979).
105. Id. at 691.
106. See id. at 707-08.
107. Id. at 709.
108. See In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other
Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4842 (2002) (outlining possible routes of ancillary jurisdiction
under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 in sections 706, 230(b), or Title VI).
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that one of the purposes of Title VI is to "assure that cable
communications provide and are encouraged to provide the widest
possible diversity of information sources and services to the
public."10 9 Just as the FCC was allowed to use ancillary jurisdiction to
regulate cable companies to promote the goals stated in Title III
applicable to broadcasters, the FCC could use its ancillary jurisdiction
over broadband providers to promote cable operators to "provide the
widest possible diversity of information sources and services to the
public."' 10 IP video delivered to consumers from a telephone
company reasonably affects cable operators just as cable operators
affected broadcasters in Southwestern Cable. This conclusion is
strengthened when noting that half of the new triple play service
market will likely be occupied by the cable operators themselves.
Another candidate for allowing net neutrality regulation under
ancillary jurisdiction is section 230(b) under Title II. Section 230(b)
provides that:
It is the policy of the United States -
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other
interactive computer services and other interactive media;
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that
presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer
services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation;
(3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize
user control over what information is received by individuals,
families, and schools who use the Internet and other interactive
computer services. I
If needed, net neutrality orders from the FCC under Title I would
help promote these goals-although the clause "unfettered by Federal
or State regulation" in 230(b)(2) may cause some hesitation.
However, as long as net neutrality regulation can be reasonably
shown to promote competition, rather than restrict it, section 230(b)
would also serve as a possible basis for net neutrality ancillary
jurisdiction.
A third basis for ancillary jurisdiction could arise under section
157, which provides: "[i]t shall be the policy of the United States to
encourage the provision of new technologies and services to the
109. 47 U.S.C. § 521(4) (2000).
110. Id.
111. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2000).
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public."'"1 2 This section also charges the FCC with determining
"whether any new technology or service proposed in a petition or
application is in the public interest."'t 13 Furthermore, the notes of this
section which comprise section 706 of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 state, "[t]he Commission and each State commission with
regulatory jurisdiction over telecommunications services shall
encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of
advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans.
' 14
Advanced telecommunications are defined "as high-speed, switched,
broadband telecommunications capability that enables users to
originate and receive high-quality voice, data, graphics, and video
telecommunications using any technology.""' 5 FCC orders preventing
the intentional blocking or degrading of Internet content or
applications would arguably encourage the deployment of broadband
capability to "originate and receive high-quality voice, data, graphics,
and video telecommunications," ' 1 6 and therefore, potentially provide
another basis for ancillary jurisdiction.
Although the boundaries of the FCC's ancillary jurisdiction as it
relates to the Internet are not yet well defined, there are several
sources from which the FCC could base net neutrality regulation
under the current Communications Act. Using Title I's ancillary
jurisdiction would also seem to best fit due to the historical role that
Title I has played in regulating new technologies on an as-needed
basis until they can be incorporated into the Communications Act by
Congress. As the Southwestern Cable Court observed:
Certainly Congress could not in 1934 have foreseen the
development of community antenna television systems, but it
seems to us that it was precisely because Congress wished "to
maintain, through appropriate administrative control, a grip on the
dynamic aspects of radio transmission," that it conferred upon the
Commission a "unified jurisdiction" and "broad authority." Thus,
"underlying the whole Communications Act is recognition of the
rapidly fluctuating factors characteristic of the evolution of
broadcasting and of the corresponding requirement that the
112. 47 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2000).
113. 47 U.S.C. § 157(b) (2000).
114. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 706(a), 110 Stat. 56,
153 (1996).
115. Id. § 706(c)(1).
116. Id.
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administrative process possess sufficient flexibility to adjust itself
to these factors."" 
7
This need for administrative flexibility is even more apparent for
the Internet industry, which has evolved, and continues to evolve,
faster than even the Southwestern Cable Court could have imagined
in 1979. Arguably, the FCC already has the authority to deal with
instances of intentional network discrimination through the use of its
ancillary jurisdiction under Title I of the Communications Act, and
therefore, if the need ever arose to prevent net neutrality abuse, the
FCC could act while Congress structures net neutrality regulation.
D. Merger by Merger Conditions and the FCC's Consumer
Choice Policy
Another tool used by the FCC has been the creation of
conditions in reviewing the mergers of telecommunication companies.
In a February 2004 speech, former FCC Chairman Michael Powell
proposed four "Internet freedoms" advocating net neutrality through
voluntary self regulation and market regulation from consumer
demand." 8 In a policy statement in 2005, the FCC adopted these
Internet freedoms to discourage broadband providers from engaging
in content discrimination and to promote consumer choice on the
Internet. 1 9 The FCC has required the telecommunication giants to
promise to adhere to this policy as a condition in the recent mergers
of Verizon with MCI, SBC with AT&T, and AT&T with
BellSouth. 12 0 As a result of these merger conditions, both of the
telephone companies that are likely to become major players in the
117. United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 172-73 (quoting FCC v. Pottsville
Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940)).
118. See Michael J. Powell, Preserving Internet Freedom: Guiding Principles for the
Industry, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 5, 11-12 (listing the four proposed Internet
freedoms as the freedom to: 1. Access content; 2. Use applications; 3. Attach personal devices;
and 4. Obtain service plan information).
119. See In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14986, 14988 (2005) (policy statement) (proclaiming four principles to
"encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the open and interconnected
nature of the public Internet" by entitling consumers to: 1. Access content; 2. Use applications;
3. Attach personal devices; and 4. Enjoy the benefits of competition amongst network providers,
application providers, and content providers).
120. See Nuechterlein, supra note 2, at 10. See also In re AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corp.
Application for Transfer of Control, 22 F.C.C.R. 5662, 5814 (2006) (memorandum opinion and
order) (adding a net neutrality condition "[e]ffective on the Merger Closing Date, and
continuing for 30 months thereafter, AT&T/BellSouth will conduct business in a manner that
comports with the principles set forth in the Commission's Policy Statement, issued September
23, 2005.").
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new triple play service market have agreed to adhere to at least a basic
level of net neutrality during this new market's development.
However, the FCC's approach has been inconsistent when
considering merger conditions placed upon cable companies. The
FCC approved the sale of AT&T's cable property to Comcast without
requiring that Comcast allow multiple ISPs to access its network. 2 '
This might be explained by the fact that Comcast's purchase predated
the release of the FCC's consumer choice policy statement in 2005122.
Moreover, the sale to Comcast occurred at a time when broadband
Internet was still in its early stages. The FCC had a newfound role
under section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, as
discussed in Part IV(C), requiring that the FCC:
[E]ncourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of
advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans... by
utilizing, in a manner consistent with the public interest,
convenience, and necessity, price cap regulation, regulatory
forbearance, measures that promote competition in the local
telecommunications market, or other regulating methods that
remove barriers to infrastructure investment.
123
This newfound role may have kept the FCC from creating any
rules against Comcast, who was then the fastest growing broadband
provider.124 Despite the lack of FCC merger conditions, most of the
major cable companies have promised at least not to engage in
blocking competing VoIP traffic.1
2 5
V. THE COSTS OF REGULATING NET NEUTRALITY Too SOON
A. The Difficulty ofIdentifying and Preventing Intentional
Network Abuse
If net neutrality regulations are put in place, distinguishing
between unintended network performance problems and intentional
anticompetitive discrimination would be difficult. As one
commentator noted, "[a]n enforcement regime that tries to distinguish
[between unintended network problems and intentional
121. See In re Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses from
Comcast Corp. and AT&T Corp., Transferors, to AT&T Comcast Corp., Transferee, 17
F.C.C.R. 23246, 23301, 23330 (2002).
122. Comcast purchased AT&T's cable property in 2002.
123. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 706(a), 110 Stat. 56, 153
(1996).
124. Yoo, supra note 43, at 53.
125. See McCullagh, supra note 55.
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discrimination] will be costly and will make some errors. This does
not necessarily tell us not to establish such an enforcement regime,
but it does give us reason to think careflully before doing so."' 2 6 The
problem is that all but the most overt acts of anticompetitive
discrimination can be explained away with excuses of network
management or unintended technical difficulty.
A good example of the ease with which network providers may
escape net neutrality enforcement is evidenced by the recently
blocked Dear AOL petition. In April of 2006, Time Warner's AOL
blocked all emails that included an Internet link to a petition letter to
AOL that voiced complaints against AOL's plan to allow companies
to bypass AOL's junk mail filters by paying a fee and submitting to a
background check by a third party company. 127 At least 300 people
reported that they had tried sending emails to AOL accounts that
included a link to the petition letter opposing AOL's new email plan,
but received a reply message informing them that their email had
"failed permanently."' 28 When confronted with this problem, AOL's
response was that it was just an innocent mishap and attributed this
blocking to a technical problem that "affected dozens of Web links in
messages."' 129 AOL explained that they "discovered the issue early
[that] morning, and [their] postmaster and mail operations team
started working to identify this software glitch., 130 This example
demonstrates some of the problems that net neutrality would
inevitably confront in attempting to differentiate genuine technical
difficulty from feigned excuses to cover up intentional abuses of net
neutrality.
Another underlying lesson from this example is that net
neutrality regulation was not needed to fix the situation. After the
group sponsoring the email petition notified the press, AOL quickly
stopped blocking the emails and had suddenly fixed the problem. 13 1
Where market demand fixed the problem within days, an
investigation or lawsuit under a net neutrality regulation would have
taken longer and would have proven unnecessary in remedying
intentional discrimination. Although a lengthy legal battle may serve
126. Felten, supra note 11, at 6.
127. See Timothy Karr, AOL Censors Opposition Site: Company Lifts Email Block After
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as a disincentive for future net neutrality abuses, throngs of
consumers switching service to a provider who does not block their
emails also serves as an effective disincentive.
B Regulating Peering May Limit the Quality-of-Service
Agreements Needed to Develop Real-Time Application
Markets
Furthermore, requiring network providers to interconnect with
content providers in a regulated and specified manner could weaken
the market for real-time applications.1 32 Mandating how content and
application providers interconnect, or in other words, imposing
peering regulations, could jeopardize the high quality-of-service
agreements needed for applications such as live video, high quality
VolP, or online gaming. Such regulations could even prevent
unknown future applications that would require higher quality-of-
service agreements than those provided for under the regulatory
scheme. 133
Ironically, as pointed out by one net neutrality commentator,
"the extent open access regulation prevents broadband operators from
architectural cooperation with ISPs for the purpose of providing [real-
time] applications.., could hurt the cause of network neutrality
[in] ... discriminat[ing] in favor of data applications [which are less
sensitive to delay]."1 34 The idea behind this observation is that the
application markets that rely on high quality-of-service agreements,
such as live video, will lose out to applications that do not require as
high of a guarantee of quality-of-service, such as video downloads
that can resend dropped packets. In a strange twist of fate, net
neutrality regulations limiting quality-of-service agreements would
then provide a competitive advantage to less time-sensitive
applications by mandating a prioritization scheme in favor of
applications requiring lower quality-of-service agreements.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although video-over-IP raises some compelling new theoretical
threats, there are still too many unknowns to justify imposing net
neutrality regulation. There may still be new technologies, such as
wireless Internet, which could compete with networks offered by
132. See Wu, supra note 6, at 149.
133. See Yoo, supra note 43, at 68.
134. Wu, supra note 6, at 149.
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cable and phone companies. There is also not enough discriminatory
abuse to justify imposing the costs and burdens of net neutrality
regulation. Furthermore, the limited cases of net neutrality abuse have
all been efficiently remedied by consumer complaints, and it remains
undetermined whether network providers will even someday want to
discriminate amongst content and application providers.
In some ways, the current legislative situation, where proposed
net neutrality regulations remain a viable threat to unscrupulous
network providers, is ideal. Network providers remain reluctant to
engage in discriminatory behavior in an effort to avoid supporting an
argument for net neutrality regulation while the government avoids
the costs and burdens of trying to enforce net neutrality regulation.
Net neutrality is a noble cause, but consumers and the threat of net
neutrality regulation have effectively prevented network
discrimination thus far without the need for cumbersome regulation.
If the convergence of services into an IP platform ever one day
presents a serious problem, net neutrality regulation is always
available. Moreover, ancillary jurisdiction under Title I may provide
an adequate solution until Congress updates the Communications Act.
Imposing an inapplicable net neutrality regulatory scheme would
create new problems in trying to solve problems that may never have
existed in the first place.
